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1 Introduction
Over the last thirty years, diﬀerent regulatory measures have been taken with regard to the
vertical organization of network industries and in particular the downstream integration of
input suppliers. On the one hand, for example, structural reforms during the 1980’s and
the 1990’s led to a separation of the transmission grid from generation in the electricity
industry (England and Wales), to a divestiture of transportation service and supply of gas in
the gas industry, and to a structural separation of local network from long-distance market
in the telecommunications industry (A&T in USA in 1982). On the other hand, the 1996
US Telecommunication Act, removed the restrictions that kept the Regional Bell Operating
Companies out of the long-distance market, and in continental Europe dominant regulated
firms have been left integrated.1
In the context of an upstream naturally monopolistic sector and a downstream unregu-
lated sector, the economics literature has shown that downstream integration can alter the
performance of the industry in two opposite ways. On the one hand, when the access price
is greater than the marginal cost of the input, an integrated firm faces lower cost in the
downstream market than its rivals. This generally yields a greater output in the downstream
market and higher welfare than under separation. Downstream integration can also lead to
a reduction in total fixed costs due to a lower number of suppliers entering the downstream
market, to eﬃciency gains from economies of scope and to a better coordination between
investments in the upstream and downstream markets (Vickers, 1995). On the other hand,
downstream integration can make it diﬃcult to create a level playing field in the downstream
market because of the incentives of the integrated firm to increase the costs of its rivals. The
firm may degrade the quality of the input to harm downstream competitors (Armstrong and
Sappington, 2005) or it may exaggerate its cost in order to convince the regulator to set a
higher access price (Vickers, 1995).
In the present paper we note that network industries are often characterized by volatile
demand conditions and analyze whether downstream integration aﬀects the incentives of firms
to estimate demand conditions and adjust production accordingly. We then analyze how these
1This view is well summarized by the position of the UK regulator which states (Oftel 2001) "an all
encompassing prevention of vertical integration would be unjustified, since it may hamper innovation in new
services, damage competition across diﬀerent platform and hinder UK firms competiting in world market.
Rather than precluding integration altogether, it is more appropriate to address any competition concerns
through action by sectoral regulator”. See also see Cowan, (2001) for an in depth discussion.
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information acquisition and transmission issues aﬀect the desirability of integration.
Consider the electricity sector. As discussed by Borenstein (2002), the demand for elec-
tricity is almost completely insensitive to price fluctuations and diﬃcult to forecast. One of
the reasons is that weather conditions cause large unpredictable fluctuations particularly in
the demand of residential consumers. The demand for electricity also varies with the level
economic growth, the technological change and with the number and types of firms using
electricity as an input for their production. Moreover, consumers of electricity are heteroge-
neous: there are consumers who require no interruption of service and consumers who are
willing to accept interruptability. Demand forecasts thus require costly predictions over the
level of industrial use of electricity and knowledge of the distribution of consumers’ types.
The importance of accurate demand estimates in the electricity industry then stems from
the need to reduce the risk of bankruptcy of the entire system and from universal service
obligation (continuity of supply in time and space). As emphasized by Borenstein (2002),
storage of electricity is very costly and capacity constraints on generation facilities cannot
be breached for significant periods without risk. This implies that there are constraints
on the amount of electricity that can be delivered at any point of time. Yet because of the
properties of electricity transmission, an imbalance of supply and demand at any one location
on an electricity grid can threaten the stability of the entire grid and disrupt delivery of the
product.2 The black-out in California in 2000 for example originated in a shortfall of supply
due to an unexpected increase in demand (Newbery, 2002).
Another industry where accurate demand estimation is critical to good performance is
telecommunications. Whilst twenty years ago the boundaries of the telecommunications
industry were stable and well defined, now a rapidly changing technology has generated a
supply of rapidly changing mix of services with a highly fluctuating demand for existing
services. Demand information is then necessary to design a network compatible with the
services oﬀered and to make adequate investment in infrastructure modernization.
In this paper we show that downstream integration in network industries strengthens the
incentives of firms to acquire valuable information on demand conditions and adjust their
production and that this increases social welfare. We consider a stylized model with an
2Hence, when there is structural separation between generation of power and its distribution, even though
the generating firms do not have a universal service obligation per se, the threat of break downs of the network
puts the generating firms in a situation where they have a de facto obligation of continuous supply.
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industry characterized by an upstream market which is a regulated natural monopoly and
an unregulated downstream market with Cournot competition, homogenous products and
demand uncertainty. The downstream demand is random and information on its realization is
valuable to the regulator for the choice of the access price and it is valuable to the downstream
firms for the choice of output. We compare the performance of two industrial structures:
integration, where the upstream firm is integrated with a downstream firm, and separation,
where the upstream firm does not operate in the downstream market.
We start by assuming that information on demand can only be acquired by the upstream
monopolist. As benchmark we then consider the case where information on demand is costly
but, once acquired, it becomes public information. In this benchmark, either integration or
separation can be optimal, depending on the parameters but not on the problem of induc-
ing information acquisition by the upstream firm. Instead, when information on demand is
privately acquired, a novel diﬀerence between the two industrial structures emerges. When
information acquisition is observable, compared to the benchmark, separation does better
than integration. This is because of an ’informational externality’ that arises when infor-
mation on demand reaches the downstream firm through the public nature of the regulatory
mechanism. When the upstream monopolist is allowed to produce in the downstream market,
underreporting demand information induces a contraction in the rival’s output and thus an
increase in downstream profits. As a consequence a greater informative rent must be granted
to the upstream firm under integration than under separation in order to induce truthful
revelation.
This result is in line with previous literature on the eﬀects of downstream integration in
regulated industries. There informational problems call for separation because integration
exacerbates the incentives of the upstream monopolist to exaggerate its own marginal cost.
Our paper shows that this is true also when asymmetric information refers to demand rather
than cost conditions.
However, when information acquisition is not observable by the regulator, as we think it
is generally the case regulator-regulated firm relationships, the eﬀect of information problems
is reversed and, as we show, integration becomes more likely to be preferable to separation.
This is because with separation information revelation by the upstream monopolist is cheap
talk. The only way for the regulator to induce information acquisition by the firm is to let
the firm operate also in the downstream market through vertical integration. Downstream
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integration makes the payoﬀ of the upstream monopolist state-dependent thus creating value
for information acquisition over the realized state.
In the second part of the paper we consider the possibility of information acquisition
by the unregulated downstream firms. We obtain two main results. First, we show that
incentives to acquire information remain stronger under integration than under separation
because the value of information for a downstream firm under separation is lower than the
value of information for the upstream monopolist under integration. This is due to incentive
compatibility for truthful revelation of demand information. Since the regulatory mechanism
is public, the information acquired by the upstream monopolist is automatically transmitted
to its rival in the downstream market. To compensate the firm for the consequent loss in
profits, the regulator must design an access price schedule that reflects demand changes in
such a way as to reduce the correlation of firms’ strategies in the downstream market. This
in turn boosts the upstream monopolist’s incentives to acquire information compared to an
unregulated downstream firm.
Second, we show that information acquisition by a downstream firm is less valuable for
social welfare than information acquisition by the upstream monopolist. This is because
information acquired by the upstream monopolist is transmitted to the downstream firms
via the regulation mechanism. Instead, information acquired by an unregulated downstream
firm remains private. We conclude that the presence of costly but valuable information on
demand in a network industry provides an argument in favour of downstream integration of
the input supplier.
Beyond being related to the issue of vertical integration in regulated industries, our paper
is also related to the literature on information acquisition on demand in unregulated indus-
tries. Hauk and Hurkens (2000) discuss information acquisition in Cournot markets and
compare the case where information acquisition is observable by the rival and when it is not.
Hurkens and Vulkan (2001) study the relationship between entry decisions and information
gathering by potential entrants, whilst Dimitrova and Schlee (2003) analyze how potential
entry aﬀects the incentives of the incumbent monopolist to acquire information on demand.
Our paper is also related to the literature on information acquisition by regulated firms un-
der optimal regulation and under price cap regulation. See for example Cremer Khalil and
Rochet, (1998) for the case of optimal regulation and Iossa and Stroﬀolini (2002) for the case
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of price cap regulation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up the model. In
section 3 we discuss the benchmark case where information acquisition is observable and
acquired information can be made public at no additional cost. Section 4 analyzes the case
where information acquisition is verifiable but the information is privately observed by the
upstream monopolist. Section 5 considers the case of unobservable information acquisition,
whilst section 6 studies the case of information acquisition by the aﬃliate. All proofs missing
from the text are in an appendix
2 The model
We consider an industry characterized by an upstream regulated natural monopoly and a
downstream unregulated market with Cournot competition, homogenous products and de-
mand uncertainty. The production in the downstream market requires an essential input
(e.g. an essential facility), produced in the upstream market. We compare two industrial
structures: Integration (I) and separation (S). I indicates a situation where the upstream
monopolist is allowed to produce, through a subsidiary, also in the downstream market while
under S it is excluded. The number of firms in the downstream market is fixed and equal
to two in both industrial structures; only one firm - in addition to the upstream monopolist
- owns the technology required to produce the output. Thus the diﬀerence between the two
industrial structures is solely that under separation the downstream firm that was subsidiary
of the upstream monopolist is now an independent firm. This allows us to obtain sharp
prediction and has no qualitative impact on our results.
The upstream market is regulated through a transfer given to the upstream monopolist
and an access price paid to the upstream monopolist by the firm(s) in the downstream market
for the utilization of the essential input. The technology used to produce the downstream
output is the same under I and S and it only requires the essential input. Thus, the upstream
monopolist’s marginal cost of production of the final good is the marginal cost of the essential
input, since the access price paid by its subsidiary is just an internal transfer, while for the
rival the marginal cost of production of the final good is the access price. Therefore, there is
a cost advantage either for the upstream monopolist or for the rival firm in the downstream
market depending on whether the regulated access price is greater or lower than the marginal
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cost of production of the essential input. We assume that the upstream monopolist and its
rival are equally eﬃcient in the downstream market and normalize to zero both the marginal
cost and the fixed cost of production.
The downstream market is characterized by a linear inverse demand function: P (Q, θ) =
θ−Q+ε, where θ, with θ ∈
£
θ, θ
¤
, is a parameter of adverse selection; it has density function
f(θ) and distribution function F (θ) satisfying the following assumption ∂∂θ (
1−F (θ)
f(θ) ) ≤ 0. f(θ)
and F (θ) are common knowledge. ε is a random error with zero mean. The parameter θ
can be interpreted either as the willingness to pay of consumers with preferences distributed
according to f(θ) or as the level of market demand with realizations distributed according
to f(θ). We denote by θ0 and by σ2 the mean value and the variance of the distribution of
θ, respectively.
The realization of θ can be privately observed at some costK by the upstream monopolist.
In most of the paper we assume that information acquisition is prohibitively costly for the
regulator and for the other firms. The regulator observes quantities and price but he cannot
infer the true value of θ because of the noise ε. The informational advantage of the upstream
monopolist stems from it being the incumbent firm. In Section 6, we relax this assumption and
discuss the possibility that the downstream firm that was once a subsidiary of the upstream
monopolist retains the technical expertise and know-how to acquire information on θ also at
cost K.
The social value of information on demand stems from it serving to the determine the
optimal access price and to adjust production in the downstream market. As explained in the
introduction, information on demand can also be necessary to ensure continuation of service
and minimize costly service disruptions. We model this eﬀect in a reduced form and denote
by u the social value of information in terms of lower risk of service disruptions. We refer to
u as to ’service standards’.
Consider now the payoﬀ of the firms, net of the information-acquisition cost. Under I,
the profit function of the upstream monopolist is given by3
ΠMI = (θ −QI)qM + aIqR + TI (1)
whereQI = qM+qR and qM and qR denote the quantity produced by the upstreammonopolist
and by the rival firm in the downstream market, respectively. TI and aI denote the transfer
3 In the rest of this paper Π(.) indicares the expected profit with respect to ε.
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received by the regulator and the access price paid by the rival. The profit function of the
rival is instead
ΠRI = (θ −QI − aI)qR (2)
Under S, the profit function of the upstream monopolist is given by
ΠMS = aSQS + TS (3)
where QS = 2qS and qS denotes the quantity produced by a downstream firm. TS and aS
denote the transfer received by the regulator and the access price paid by the downstream
firms. The profit of a downstream firm is
ΠDS = (θ −QS − aS)qS (4)
The objective function of the regulator is given by the social value of the net consumer
surplus plus the firms’ profits. Let S(θ,Q) denote the gross consumer surplus, with S0(θ,Q) =
P (θ,Q) and S00(θ,Q) ≤ 0, and let λ > 0 denote the shadow cost of public funds due to the
use of distorsive taxation to finance the transfer to the upstream monopolist. The objective
function of the regulator under I, when there is information acquisition, can then be written
as
WI = S(θ,QI)− P (θ,QI)QI − (1 + λ)TI +ΠMI +ΠRI −K + u
Under S, when there is information acquisition, the regulator’s objective function is
WS = S(θ,QS)− P (θ,QS)QS − (1 + λ)TS +ΠMS + 2ΠDS −K + u
The timing of the game is the following. 1) Nature chooses θ; 2) the regulator oﬀers the
upstream monopolist the menu of contracts {aI(θ), TI(θ)} under I and {aS(θ), TS(θ)} under
S; 3) the monopolist decides whether to acquire information on θ by investing K, and it
observes θ if it does; 4) the monopolist decides whether to accept the contract oﬀered by the
regulator; the firms in the downstream market simultaneously choose their quantities; the
transfer Th and the access price ah (h = I, S) are paid.
3 Costly Public Information
As benchmark we consider the case where information acquisition is observable and infor-
mation can be made public at no additional cost. The optimal regulatory mechanism then
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induces the upstream monopolist to acquire information at cost K, then the information
acquired is made public and used to adjust production in the downstream market. Under I,
maximization of (1) w.r.t. qM and of (2) w.r.t. qR then yields the equilibrium variables in
the downstream market as function of θ and aI
qM(θ, aI) =
θ + aI
3
; qR(θ, aI) =
θ − 2aI
3
;QI(θ, aI) =
2θ − aI
3
;PI(θ, aI) =
θ + aI
3
(5)
Similarly, under S maximization of (??) w.r.t. qS yields the equilibrium variables under
Cournot competition in the downstream market as function of θ and aS
qS(θ, aS) =
θ − aS
3
;QS(θ, aS) =
2θ − 2aS
3
;PS(θ, aS) =
θ + 2aS
3
(6)
Let wI(θ, aI) = S(θ,QI) + λPIqM + λaIqR and wS(θ, aS) ≡ S(θ,QS) + λaSQS , we can
rewrite the objective function of the regulator as
Wh(θ, ah,ΠMh ,K, u) = wh(θ, aI)− λΠMh −K + u h=I,S (7)
The regulator’s problem then consists in setting, for each realization of θ, the couple©
ah(θ),ΠMh (θ)
ª
that maximizes respectively Wh (given by 7) subject to the following two
constraints
EΠMh (θ)−K ≥ 0, h=I,S (IR-IA)
ΠMh (θ) ≥ 0 for all θ
£
θ, θ
¤
h=I,S (IR)
where (IR − IA) ensures that the upstream monopolist finds it profitable to acquire infor-
mation about θ; whilst (IR) ensures that the upstream monopolist accepts the regulatory
contract once it has observed the realization of θ.4 It is then immediate that, at the solution
of the maximization problem the firm enjoys no rent in expectation (i.e. EΠMh (θ) = K) and
the optimal access prices under I and under S are respectively given by
a∗I(θ) =
(5λ− 1)θ
1 + 10λ
(8)
a∗S(θ) =
θ (3λ− 1)
2 + 6λ
(9)
with a∗h(θ) increasing in λ. Under both I and S, the positive relationship between the access
price and the shadow cost of public funds reflects a sort of Ramsey prices. On the one hand,
4We ignore the participation constraint of the rival, which can be shown to be always satisfied in equilibrium.
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the higher ah, the lower the transfer that needs to be paid to the upstream monopolist in
order to ensure its participation. Ceteris paribus, this has a positive eﬀect on welfare because
it reduces distortionary taxation. On the other hand, the higher ah, the lower the output
in the downstream market (from 5). Ceteris paribus, this reduces welfare since production
in the downstream market is suboptimal. Since the first eﬀect is increasing in λ, whilst the
second one is independent of λ, a more distortionary taxation (a greater value of λ) induces
a higher level of the access price and a lower level of output. For suﬃciently high λ, the
first eﬀect dominates: a∗h(θ) is positive, i.e. higher than the marginal cost in the upstream
market, and it is increasing in θ. For low λ, the second eﬀect dominates: a∗h(θ) is negative,
i.e. lower than the marginal cost in the upstream market, and it is decreasing in θ.
In light of the above analysis let W ∗h (θ,K, u) denote the maximum value function under
costly public information and information acquisition, whereW ∗h (θ,K, u) = wh(θ, a∗h(θ))−(1+
λ)K + u. The expected welfare from information acquisition under costly public information
is then
EW ∗h (θ,K, u) = Ewh(θ, a∗h(θ))− (1 + λ)K + u (10)
Instead, if information acquisition does not occur, the expected welfare is given by
Ew∗h(θ0) = w∗h(θ0), where w∗h(θ0) ≡ Ew∗h(a∗h(θ0), θ), due to linear demand. Taking the
diﬀerence between EW ∗h (.) and w∗h(θ0) we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Costly public information on demand is socially valuable for K ≤ K∗h, where
K∗I =
1+8λ+5λ2
2(1+λ)(1+10λ)σ
2 + u(1+λ) and K
∗
S =
(1+λ)
2(1+3λ)(1+λ)σ
2 + u(1+λ)
Under both I and S, public information on demand θ is socially valuable because social
welfare maximization calls for a diﬀerent access price for any given θ and profit maximization
calls for quantities under Cournot competition to vary with θ. Clearly the social value of
information also increases with service standards u.
We can now compare the two industry structures.
Proposition 1 Under costly public information, there exists a level of λ, denoted by λ∗ > 0,
such that (i) W ∗S(θ,K, u) T W ∗I (θ,K, u) and w∗S(θ0) T w∗I (θ0) for λ S λ∗; (ii) K∗S(λ, u) T
K∗I (λ, u) for λ S λ∗. That is for λ ≥ λ∗, under I expected welfare and the value of information
are at least as high than under S. The opposite statement holds for λ < λ∗ .
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Under both I and S, the regulator uses the access price to reduce the need for distortionary
taxation and to aﬀect the behaviour of the firms in the downstream market. When λ is high,
reducing the level of distortionary taxation is particularly important and thus the social
value of the revenue obtained by the upstream monopolist in downstream market under I
is high. This eﬀect favours I. When λ is low, reducing the level of distortionary taxation is
less important and the main concern of the regulator becomes to increase production in the
downstream market. This calls for a low access price and it favours S.
4 Observable information acquisition with private informa-
tion
In this section we consider the case where information acquisition is observable but the
information is privately observed by the upstream monopolist. In this case, the regulator
can demand the upstream monopolist to incur cost K to acquire information and use a
direct truthful regulatory mechanism of the form: {ah(θ),ΠMh (θ)}, with h = I, S.We assume
that the regulatory mechanism is public information and so is the report bθ made by the
monopolist. This is realistic, given the lack of control on the activities of regulators if we
assumed otherwise.5
4.1 Integration
Under I, consider the game played in the downstream market. Given the demand parameter
announced by the upstream monopolist bθ and the access price set by the regulator, aI(bθ),
the upstream monopolist chooses qM to maximize
ΠMI (θ,bθ) = (θ − qM − qR)qM + aI(bθ)qR + TI(bθ) (11)
whilst the rival chooses qR so as to maximize
ΠRI (bθ) = (bθ − qM − qR − aI(bθ))qR
Since in equilibrium bθ = θ, the rival learns the realization of demand from the report
of the monopolist and uses it to set its own output. Thus, there is an informational exter-
nality: the information that the upstream monopolist acquires becomes public through the
5 It is also possible to show that if eθ were confidential information, under plausible assumptions ensuring
strict monotonicity, its value could be easily inferred from the value of ah(eθ).
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regulatory mechanism; this aﬀects the strategy of the rival and, through this, the payoﬀ of
the monopolistic firm.
From the above two equations we obtain the equilibrium quantities produced in the down-
stream market for any given level of bθ and aI(bθ)
qM(θ,bθ) = 3θ − bθ + 2aI(bθ)
6
; qR(bθ) = bθ − 2aI(bθ)
3
(12)
By substituting for these equilibrium quantities in the profit function of the upstream mo-
nopolist, given by (11), and using standard techniques, we obtain the following two incentive
compatibility conditions for truth-telling
IC1 :
∂ΠMI (θ)
∂θ
= qM(θ,bθ = θ) = θ + aI(θ)
3
> 0
IC2 :
∂2ΠMI (θ)
∂θ∂bθ = ∂aI(θ)∂θ > 12
From (IC1) we note that the firm has incentives to underreport the realization of θ. How
strong these incentives are depends on the rival’s reaction in the unregulated market which
in turns depends on whether the rival is informed or not. Suppose for a moment that also
the rival is informed and sets its output on the basis of the true realization of θ. In this case,
the profit function of the incumbent from reporting bθ would be
ΠML (θ,bθ) = (θ − qM(θ,bθ)− qR(θ,bθ))qM(θ,bθ) + aL(bθ)qR(θ,bθ) + TL(bθ)
with qM(θ,bθ) = θ+a(eθ)3 and qR(θ,bθ) = θ−2a(eθ)3 , and we would have
∂ΠML (θ,bθ)
∂θ
= qM(θ,bθ)− ∂qR
∂θ
³
qM(θ,bθ)− a(bθ)´ = 2θ + 5a(bθ)
9
Thus when also the rival is informed, the gain from underreporting θ is as follows. First,
the higher θ the greater the profit that the upstream monopolist can obtain in the downstream
market for any given level of output produced by the rival. This eﬀect is positive and given by
qM(θ,bθ). Second, the higher θ the greater the output of the rival in the downstream market,
which in turn generates two eﬀects: it reduces the profits of the upstream monopolist in the
downstream market (−∂qR∂θ qM(θ,bθ)), which is the standard result under Cournot competition
with homogeneous products, and on the other hand it increases the access revenues due to
greater output by the rival ∂q
R
∂θ a(bθ). The sum of these two eﬀects is negative, but is more than
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compensated by the first eﬀect described above. Overall, the firm gains from underreporting
θ.
Now consider the case studied in this paper where the rival is uninformed and chooses
its output on the basis of bθ, the level of demand reported by the upstream monopolist. An
informational externality aﬀects the incumbent’s incentives to underreport θ.6 Since the
output of the rival depends on bθ and not on θ, the terms −∂qR∂θ qM(θ,bθ) and ∂qR∂θ a(bθ) (whose
sum is negative) disappear and only the positive term qM(θ,bθ) remains. The incentives to
underreport demand are strengthened by the fact that by underreporting θ the upstream
monopolist can now induce the rival to reduce output; overall the informative externality
leads to a greater informative rent.
Consider now the optimal mechanism. Let EΠMI (θ, aI(θ)) denote the expected rent of the
upstream monopolist for given access price and let µ be the non-negative multiplier associated
with information acquisition constraint (IR− IA), the following lemma obtains.
Lemma 2 Let bK0I ≡ EΠMI (θ,baI(θ, µ = 0)) and bK1I ≡ EΠMI (θ,baI(θ, µ = λ)) with bK1I > bK0I
Under observable information acquisition, the optimal access price schedule with integration
is given by
baI(θ, µ) ≡ θ(5λ− 1)− 3(λ− µ(K))1−F (θ)f(θ)
1 + 10λ
(13)
where (i) forK ≤ bK0I , µ(K) = 0; (ii) forK ∈ ( bK0I , bK1I ), µ(K) ∈ (0, λ) solves EΠMI (θ,baI(θ, µ)) =
K;with µ0(K) ≥ 0; and (iii) for K ≥ bK1I , µ(K) = λ.
The intuition is as follows. When K is low (i.e. K < bK0I ), the expected rent - evaluated at
a∗I(θ) - is greater than K. Thus the (IR− IA) constraint is slacking and we are in a standard
adverse selection problem. To reduce this rent, which has a social cost of λ, the regulator
introduces a downward distortion in the access-price schedule with respect to the perfect
information allocation (8) for all θ < θ. This leads to baI(θ, µ = 0). As K raises, eventually
it reaches a level, bK0I , where the expected rent, evaluated at baI(θ, µ = 0), is equal to K.
From this value of K onwards, the (IR− IA) constraint starts to be binding. Thus there is
6This informational externality of regulation is highlighted also by Calzolari and Scarpa (2006) who consider
a multiutility firm active both in a regulated and in an unregulated market, with private information about
economies of scope.
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no longer a need to minimize the informative rent, and in fact, the firm needs to receive an
additional transfer to help it cover the cost of acquiring information. The distortion in the
access price is gradually reduced, and as K reaches the value bK1I , the access price schedule
returns to its full information level, a∗I(θ) . For even higher K, the firm is compensated for
the information acquisition cost with an increase in the monetary transfer.7
Let cWI(θ,K, u) denote the maximum value function under observable information ac-
quisition when there is information acquisition and EcWI(θ,K, u) its expectation. If instead
there is no information acquisition, the maximum value function is given by w∗I (θ0). We de-
note by bK∗I the level of K such that for K ≥ bK∗I information acquisition is suboptimal. Since
EcWI(.) ≤ EW ∗I (.), we have bK∗I ≤ K∗I .
Now consider how the unobservability of θ aﬀects the performance of regulation. Letb∆I(.) ≡ max{EW ∗I (θ,K, u), w∗I (θ0)} −max{EcWI(θ,K, u), w∗I (θ0)} and without loss of gen-
erality consider the case where bK1I ≤ K∗I . The following lemma is then obtained.
Lemma 3 (i) b∆I(K) > 0; with ∂ e∆I(K)∂K = µ(K)− λ < 0 for all K < bK1I ; (ii) b∆I(K) = 0 for
K ≥ bK1I . That is, asymmetric information reduces expected welfare under integration for all
K < bK1I , whilst it has no eﬀects for K ≥ bK1I .
Lemma 3 is easily understood in light of the fact that for K < bK1I information acquisition
is optimal but it is costly in terms of expected rent due to asymmetric information. For
K > bK1I , the rent is insuﬃcient to cover information acquisition cost. The IC constraint
(IC1) starts to slack, whilst the (IR− IA) starts to bind as under costly public information
leading to EW ∗I (θ,K, u) = EcWI(θ,K, u). It also follows from this that bK∗I = K∗I and thatb∆I is independent of u.
4.2 Separation
Following the same reasoning as under I, consider the game played in the downstream market
when the value of demand parameter announced by the upstream monopolist is bθ. Antici-
pating that in equilibrium bθ = θ, a downstream firm chooses qS so as to maximize
ΠDS (bθ) = (bθ − 2qS − aS(bθ))qS
7Second order conditions are satisfied and the constraint IC2 is satisfied provided that
−3
2
+ 5λ− 3(λ− µ) ∂∂θ (
1− F (θ)
f(θ) ) ≥ 0
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yielding qS(bθ) = eθ−aS(eθ)3 and profit for the upstream monopolist equal to
ΠMS (bθ) = aS(bθ)2qS(bθ) + TS(bθ) (14)
It follows that ∂Π
M
S (θ)
∂θ = 0, which implies that the upstream monopolist has no incentives
to misreport the value of θ and therefore the optimal mechanism is the same as under costly
public information. Intuitively, under S the profits of the upstream monopolist are equal to
the access revenues which only depend on the quantities produced by the downstream firms.
These quantities are in turn independent of θ : since the downstream firms are ignorant, their
output decisions are taken on the basis of the reported realization of θ and not of its true
realization. It follows that the profits of the upstream monopolist are independent of the true
realization of θ. This explains why the informational externality generated by the regulatory
mechanism, as under I, works, contrary to I, in favour of truthful reporting of θ. Indeed if the
downstream firms were informed, by underreporting θ the incumbent could gain the greater
access revenues corresponding to the true realization of θ. In particular, if the downstream
firms were informed, we would have
ΠMS (θ,bθ) = a(bθ)Q(θ,bθ) + TS(bθ)
with Q(θ,bθ) = 2θ−2a(eθ)3 and
∂ΠMS (θ,bθ)
∂θ
= a(bθ)∂Q
∂θ
> 0 (15)
That is, with informed downstream firms, it would be more costly for the regulator to
extract information about demand from the upstream monopolist because the firm would
have incentives to underreport θ in order to raise its access revenues.
Let EcWS(θ,K, u) denote the expected maximum value function under S when there is
information acquisition and information acquisition is observable. We have
EcWS(θ,K, u) = EW ∗S(θ,K, u) (16)
For K > bK∗S there is no information acquisition and the maximum value function is given by
w∗S(θ0), and it follows from (16) that bK∗S = K∗S. Let b∆S(.) = max {EW ∗S(θ,K, u), w∗S(θ0)}−
max{EcWS(θ,K, u), w∗S(θ0)} in light of (16) we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 4 b∆S = 0 for all K and u. That is, under separation, asymmetric information has
no eﬀect on welfare.
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Under observable information acquisition, asymmetric information has no eﬀect on the
eﬃciency of the regulatory mechanism since the monopolist has no incentives to misreport the
level of demand; the optimal access price is then given by (9), and the (IR− IA) constraints
is binding for all K > 0.
4.3 Comparison
From Lemmas 3 and 4 we have seen that for all K < bK1I asymmetric information creates a
distortion in the optimal mechanism under I but not under S, whilst for all K ≥ bK1I under
both I and S there is no distortion. The Proposition below is then obtained.
Proposition 2 (i) b∆I(K) − b∆S > 0 and ∂(e∆I(K)−e∆S)∂K = µ(K) − λ < 0 for K < bK1I , where
µ(K) is defined in Lemma 2. (ii) b∆I(K)− b∆S = 0 for K ≥ bK1I . That is, when information
acquisition is costly but observable, asymmetric information on demand generates a bias in
favour of separation for all K < bK1I , whilst it has no eﬀect on the welfare comparison between
Integration and separation for all K ≥ bK1I . The bias in favour of separation over the range
K < bK1I decreases with K.
5 Unobservable information acquisition
In this section we consider the case where information acquisition is unobservable.
5.1 Integration
Consider the case of I, when the regulator induces through the choice of the regulatory
mechanism the upstream monopolist to acquire information. In this case, an additional
constraint needs to be added to the regulator’s maximization program (PL-1) compared to the
case where information acquisition is observable. This is the incentive compatibility constraint
on information acquisition, (IC − IA), which ensures that, under the optimal mechanism,
the upstream monopolist prefers to incur K to become informed about the realization of θ
rather than remain uninformed.
In this context, it is easy to show that with linear demand function an uninformed up-
stream monopolist would choose the contract corresponding to the mean of the distribution
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of θ : {a(θ0), T (θ0)} . By using equations (IC1) and (20), the (IC − IA) is then given by
EΠMI (θ)−ΠMI (θ0) =
Z θ
θ
θ + aI(θ)
3
(1− F (θ)−Υθ<θ0)dθ ≥ K (IC-IA)
where Υ is a dummy variable with Υ = 1 if θ < θ0 and Υ = 0 if θ ≥ θ0. Let ν denote the
non-negative multiplier of the (IC − IA), the regulator’s problem is then
max
aI(θ),ΠMI (θ)
Z θ
θ
WI(θ, aI (θ) ,ΠMI (θ),K, u)dF (θ)
s.t. : (IR− IA), (IR), (IC1), (IC2), (IC − IA)
We obtain the following Lemma.
Lemma 5 Let eKI = 16(1+ ∂eaI (θ,µ=0)∂θ )σ2 < K0I . Under unobservable information acquisition,
the optimal access price schedule with I is given by
eaI(θ, ν) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
θ(5λ−1)−3(λ−ν(K)) 1−F (θ)f(θ)
1+10λ for θ > θ0
θ(5λ−1)−3

λ 1−F (θ)f(θ) +ν(K)
F (θ)
f(θ)

1+10λ for θ < θ0
(17)
where (i) ν(K) = 0 for K ≤ eKI , (ii) ν(K) ∈ (0, λ] and solves
EΠMI (θ, ν)−ΠMI (θ0) = K (18)
with ν0(K) > 0 and v(K) ≥ µ(K),for K > eKI .
Information is valuable to the upstream monopolist since it yields an informative rent.
For K ≤ eKI this informative rent is suﬃcient to induce information acquisition and the
optimal mechanism remains the same as under observable information acquisition. Instead,
when K > eKI , the optimal mechanism needs to be modified. Recall constraint (IC-IA).
Depending on whether θ is greater or smaller than θ0 an increase in aI(.) has one or two
(opposing) eﬀects on the value of information. An increase in aI(.) increases EΠMI (θ) by
(1− F (θ)) and eases the information constraint, but for θ ∈ (θ ,θ0) a unit increase in aI(.)
increase also ΠMI (θ0) by a unit and makes the information constraint tighter. Therefore eaI(θ)
is higher than baI(θ) for large values of θ and smaller for low θ which implies a discontinuity
at θ0.
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Let fWI(θ,K, u) denote the maximum value function under unobservable information
acquisition when information acquisition is induced, and let EfWI(.) denote its expecta-
tion. From Lemma 5, we have that EfWI(.) is decreasing in K and there exists a eK∗I (u)
such that for K ≤ eK∗I (u) there is information acquisition and EfWI(.) is obtained, whilst
for K > eK∗I (u) there is no information acquisition and the maximum value function is
given by Ew∗I (θ0) = w∗I (θ0), where it is immediate that eK∗I (u) is increasing in u and thateK∗I (u) ≤ bK∗I (u).
Let e∆I(.) = max{EcWI(.), w∗I (θ0)}−max{EfWI(.), w∗I (θ0)}, that is e∆I denotes the welfare
diﬀerence under I between the case where information acquisition is observable and the case
where it is not observable.
Lemma 6 Under unobservable information acquisition, (i) e∆I = 0 forK ≤ eKI ; (ii) e∆I(K,u) >
0, with ∂
h∆I(K,u)
∂K = ν(K) − µ(K),
∂ h∆I(K,u)
∂u ≥ 0 for K ∈ ( eKI ,K∗I (u)], (iii) e∆I(K) = 0 for
K > K∗I (u).
Intuitively, when K is low (case (i) in the Lemma), the unobservability of information
acquisition does not induce any welfare loss since the firm has incentives to acquire infor-
mation in order to gain the informational rent. However, as K increases (case (ii)) inducing
information becomes costly. The (IC−IA) constraint starts to bind and the regulator starts
to distort the mechanism in order to provide the firm with incentives to acquire information.
When K increases even further (case (iii)) information acquisition becomes so costly that it
is preferable for welfare not to induce it.
5.2 Separation
Consider the value of information for the upstream monopolist under S. Recall that ∂Π
M
S
∂θ = 0,
which as we have seen implies that there is no gain for the upstream monopolist from misrre-
porting the value of the demand parameter. Whilst this is a positive result for the regulator
when information acquisition is observable, it becomes problematic when information acqui-
sition is not observable, as the lemma below emphasizes.
Lemma 7 Under unobservable information acqisition the upstream monopolist never ac-
quires information under separation.
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Intuitively, since the monopolist cannot extract any informative rent from acquiring in-
formation under S, it will have no incentives to invest K in order to learn the value of
θ, or to put it diﬀerently, since the monopolist does not produce in the downstream mar-
ket, information revelation is a cheap talk game. It follows from the above lemma that
the optimal regulatory mechanism will be given by {a∗S(θ0),Π∗S(θ0)}, leading to an ex-
pected welfare of EfWS(θ,K, u) = w∗S(θ0). Then, letting e∆S(.) = max{EcWS(.), w∗S(θ0)} −
max{EfWS(.), w∗S(θ0)}, we obtain the lemma below.
Lemma 8 (i) e∆S (K,u) > 0, for all K ≤ K∗S(u), with ∂ h∆S(K)∂K = −(1 + λ), ∂ h∆S(K,u)∂u > 0,
ii) e∆S = 0 for all K > K∗S(u).
Since there is no information acquisition under S, a welfare loss due to the unobservability
of information acquisition will arise whenever information acquisition is socially desirable, i.e.
whenever K ≤ K∗S.
5.3 Comparison
We now study how the unobservability of information acquisition aﬀects the performance of
the two regimes, I and S, compared to a situation where information acquisition is observable
by the regulator. The proposition below summarizes our main result.
Proposition 3 (i) If λ ≤ λ∗, unobservability of information acquisition creates a bias in
favour of Integration (i.e., e∆I(K,u) ≤ e∆S(K,u)) and this bias is non-increasing in K;
(ii) If λ > λ∗, there exists a level of K, denoted by K∗(u), where K∗ ∈ ( eKI , eK∗I ) such
that for K ≤ K∗(u) unobservability of information acquisition creates a bias in favour of
Integration (i.e., e∆I(K,u) ≤ e∆S(K,u)) and this bias is non-increasing in K. For K >
K∗(u) unobservability of information acquisition creates a bias in favour of separation (i.e.,e∆I(K,u) ≥ e∆S(K,u)) and this bias is non-decreasing in K for K ≤ K∗S(u).
The above proposition follows from a combination of two eﬀects. First, as we have seen
in the previous section, it is easier to induce information acquisition under I than under S.
Ceteris paribus this creates a bias in favour of I. Intuitively, inducing information acquisition
is easier under I than under S because information on θ is more valuable to the firm when
it can use this information also to choose output in the product market (as under I) than
when it cannot (as under S). This result is close to Iossa and Legros (2004) who have shown
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that property rights can help to increase incentives to acquire information. Second, the value
of information acquisition depends on λ. If λ ≤ λ∗ information acquisition is more valuable
under S than under I (since K∗S ≥ K∗I , and bK∗S ≥ bK∗I ) and thus more is lost from lack of
information under S compared to I. These two eﬀects go in the same direction and explain
point (i). Instead, if λ > λ∗, information acquisition is more valuable under I than under S
(since K∗S < K∗I ) and the two eﬀects go in opposite direction. Then, for low K information
acquisition is valuable under both I and S and a bias arises in favour of I. For high K the
opposite is true. This explains point (ii).
Before concluding this section consider the eﬀect of an increase in the social value of
information, as captured by an increase in u. From Lemmas 6 and 8, we obtain.
Corollary 1 The greater is u the more unobservability of information acquisition is likely to
generate a bias in favour of Integration.
Intuitively, an increase in the social value of information (u) increases the welfare loss
due to the unobservability of information acquisition both under I and under S (e∆I ande∆S are non-decreasing in u). However, since under S the regulatory mechanism does not
provide any incentives to acquire information, an increase in the social value of information
increases the welfare loss (
h∆S
∂u > 0) whatever the cost information acquisition (K). Instead,
under I,an increase in the social value of information does not aﬀect the welfare loss due to
the unobservable information acquisition for all values of K where the regulatory mechanism
induces information acquisition (
h∆I
∂u = 0 for low level of K, i.e. K ≤ eK∗I ∈ [ eKI ,K∗I )).
6 Information acquisition by the aﬃliate
Until now we have assumed that the upstream monopolist is the only firm that, at cost K,
can acquire information on the realization of θ. However, if we take into account that one of
the two downstream firms was an aﬃliate of the upstream monopolist before the separation,
it seems possible that also this firm will have the technology and the know-how to acquire
information on θ. In this section we allow for this possibility. We let the cost of information
acquisition for the downstream firm be K and we assume again that information acquisition
is unobservable. Contrary to the upstream monopolist, the downstream firm is unregulated
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and thus the information it acquires will not be transmitted to its rival neither will it be used
to set the access price.
Under unobservable information acquisition, the optimal mechanism is the same as when
the downstream firm cannot acquire information, and it is given by {aS(θ0),ΠMS (θ0)}. This
is because the total output is linear in aS and the regulator does not know θ at the time of
choosing the regulatory mechanism.
In light of this, consider the incentives of the downstream firm to acquire information.
It is easy to show that qNS (θ0, aS) =
θ0−aS
3 is the quantity produced by an uninformed firm
when also the rival is uninformed, whilst qS(θ, θ0, aS) = θ2 −
θ0
6 −
aS
3 is the quantity produced
the downstream firm when it acquires information and the rival is uninformed.
Denoting by ΠDS (θ, θ0, aS) the maximum value function of the downstream firm when it
acquires information and the rival is uninformed and by ΠDS (θ0, aS) the expected profit of
the firm when it does not acquire information, we obtain the value of information for the
downstream firm
EΠDS (θ, θ0, aS)−ΠDS (θ0, aS) =
∂2ΠDS (θ, θ0, aS)
∂2θ
σ2
2
=
σ2
4
(19)
which leads us to the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 The incentives to acquire information of the aﬃliate under Separation are
lower than the incentives to acquire information of the upstream monopolist under Integration;
the aﬃliate acquiring information on θ for all K ≤ eKS, where eKS = σ24 < eKI .
Since the downstream firm is not regulated, its information cannot be used to set the
access price which will therefore be set on the basis of the expected value of θ. Further,
the access price cannot be used as an instrument to increase the firm’s incentives to acquire
information. The value of information for the downstream firm is then given only by the
profitability of adjusting its output level to the realized level of demand. For K ≤ eKS , this
eﬀect induces information acquisition. However, eKS < eKI , defined in Lemma 5 the value of
information for the downstream firm under S is smaller than the value of information for the
upstream monopolist under I. This is a consequence of the fact that the upstream monopolist
is regulated and the regulatory mechanism is public knowledge whilst the downstream firm
is not regulated.
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In particular, information acquired by the upstream monopolist is revealed to its rival
through the regulatory mechanism. This generates two opposite eﬀects. First, the rival
adjusts its output to the realized value of demand: the greater is θ, the greater is the rival’s
output. This first eﬀect increases the correlation of firms’ strategies and thus reduces the
upstream monopolist’s gain from acquiring information.
However, the second eﬀect works in an opposite direction and more than compensate the
first one. Incentive compatibility requires that the access price be an increasing function of θ.
Thus a greater θ reduces the rival’s output via the increase in the access price and this lowers
the correlation of firms’ strategies and raises the upstream monopolist’s gain from acquiring
information. Rewriting (IC2) as
∂2ΠMI (θ)
∂θ∂bθ = −12 ∂q
R(θ)
∂θ
= −1
6
µ
1− 2∂aI(θ)
∂θ
¶
> 0
with
∂aI(θ)
∂θ
>
1
2
⇐⇒ ∂q
R(θ)
∂θ
< 0
we see that incentive compatibility calls for the sensitivity of the regulated access price to
be high enough to make the rival’s quantity decrease with θ. In other words, the access
price structure must reflect demand changes in such as way as to reduce the correlation of
firms’ strategies in the downstream market. This in order to compensate the firm for the
loss in profits due to the transmission of information generated by the public nature of the
regulatory mechanism. As a result, eKS < eKI : a regulated upstream monopolist has stronger
incentives to acquire information than an unregulated downstream firm8.
The role played by the public nature of the regulatory mechanism explains why the above
result stands in contrast with the case of information sharing about a common value in an
unregulated Cournot market.9 In that context knowledge by a rival firm of its own profit
function leads to higher correlation of strategies and thus reduces the incumbent’s profit so
that there is no incentive for a firm to transmit information about demand parameter to the
rival.
8The value of information for either firm is proportional to the sensitivity of output to θ, and the output of
the informed upstream monopolist under I is more sensitive to θ than the output of the informed downstream
firm under S.In particular, let qi = θ−q
R
2
be the output chosen under Cournot competition by the firm who
acquires information, with i = M under I and i = D under S, and with qR = θ−2a(θ)
3
denoting the output
of the rival. Then the sensitivity of output of the upstream monopolist firm with respect to θ is given by:
1
2

1− ∂q
R
∂θ

, whilst the sensitivity of output of the downstream is 1
2
, since information is not passed onto
the rival.
9See Raith (1996) for a general model.
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More importantly, the result of Proposition 4 implies that unobservability of information
acquisition creates a bias in favour of Integration also when the aﬃliate can acquire infor-
mation. Not only does the aﬃliate have weaker incentives to acquire information than an
upstream monopolist but also, when the aﬃliate acquires information it does so privately.
No socially valuable information transmission to either the rival or the regulator takes place.
We summarize this result in the following corollary.
Corollary 2 Unobservability of informaiton acquistion creates a bias in favour of Integration
also when the aﬃliate can acquire information.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the desirability of allowing an upstream monopolist to operate in
the downstream market (integration) rather than to exclude it (separation), in the presence of
costly demand information. We have shown that asymmetric information on demand favours
separation but unobservability of information acquisition favours integration. We have also
shown that the greater the value of information about demand the more integration is likely
to be preferable to separation. Thus integration may be preferable in industries such as
telecommunication and electricity where demand is uncertain and lack of information on
demand can generate very costly service disruptions. The case for integration based on the
issue of demand information is instead weaker in industries where the value of information
on demand is smaller.
We have focused on the case where the number of firms is the same under both integration
and separation. An extension of our analysis could be to study how the cost of acquiring
that technology may aﬀect entry decisions.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Under I, information acquisition is optimal if Ew∗I (θ)−w∗I (θ0) + u ≥
(1 + λ)K. By using Taylor expansion we can rewrite
Ew∗I (θ)− w∗I (θ0) =
∂2wI(θ)
∂2θ
σ2
2
=
1 + 8λ+ 5λ2
2(1 + 10λ)
σ2
leading to K∗I .The same procedure proves K∗S¥
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) First note that W ∗S(θ, λ, u,K) = W ∗I (θ, λ, u,K) at λ = 0,
and dW
∗
I (θ,λ,u)
dλ
¯¯¯
λ=0
= −θ2, dW
∗
S(θ,λ,u)
dλ
¯¯¯
λ=0
= −θ2
2
which implies W ∗S(θ, λ, u) > W ∗I (θ, λ, u) in
a neighborhood of λ = 0. Tedious calculations then give d
2W∗I (θ,λ,u)
dλ2 −
d2W∗S(θ,λ,u)
dλ2 = b, where
b is a positive constant, which implies that there exists a λ∗ > 0, independent of θ, such
that W ∗S(θ, λ, u) < W ∗I (θ, λ, u) for all λ > λ
∗, and vice versa. (ii). From (i) EW ∗S(θ, λ, u) −
w∗S(θ0, λ) = EW ∗I (θ, λ, u) − w∗I (θ0, λ) at λ = 0 and λ = λ∗, i.e. K∗S(λ, u) = K∗I (λ, u) at
λ = 0, λ = λ∗. Furthermore from the definition of K∗S(λ, u) and K∗I (λ, u) it easy to show that
they are continuous non-increasing functions of λ with
¯¯¯
∂K∗S(λ,u)
∂λ
¯¯¯
<
¯¯¯
∂K∗I (λ,u)
∂λ
¯¯¯
at λ = 0 and¯¯¯
∂K∗S(λ,u)
∂λ
¯¯¯
>
¯¯¯
∂K∗I (λ,u)
∂λ
¯¯¯
at λ = λ∗; so the result follows.¥
Proof of Lemma 2 Using standard techniques, from (IC1), we obtain the expected rent
of the upstream monopolist
EΠMI (θ, aI(θ)) = ΠMI (θ) +
Z θ
θ
θ + aI(θ)
3
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
dF (θ) (20)
The regulator’s problem is then to determine, for each θ, the couple (baI(θ), bΠMI (θ)) which
solves the following maximization problem (referred to as PL-1)
max
aI(θ),ΠMI (θ)
Z θ
θ
WI(θ, aI(θ),ΠMI (θ),K, u)dF (θ) (PL-1)
s.t. : (IR− IA), (IR), (IC1)(IC2) (21)
where in (IR − IA), the expected rent is given by (20). Since the objective function of
program (PL-1) is strictly concave and the constraint (IR − IA) is linear in aI and in K,
the problem is convex with an unique solution. Neglecting for the moment constraint (IC2),
maximization of the the Lagrangian of program (PL-1) w.r.t. a yields
−(1 + 10λ)baI(.)− θ + 5λθ − 3(λ− µ)1− F (θ)f(θ) = 0
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where the SOC and constraint (IC2) are satisfied provided that−32+5λ−3(λ−µ)
∂
∂θ (
1−F (θ)
f(θ) ) ≥
0. Now, consider the case where (IR − IA) is not binding and µ = 0. Substituting for
aI = baI(θ, µ = 0) in (20) we obtain bK0I . Thus, µ = 0 is the solution for K ≤ bK0I . Substituting
for aI = baI(θ, µ = λ) in the same equation, we obtain bK1I .
(i)Since WI() is strictly concave and the (IR− IA) constraint is linear in aI and in K, it
follows that its value function, EcWI , is concave in K and µ(K) = −∂EfWI(.)∂K − 1. Given the
concavity of EcWI , µ(K) is a non-decreasing function of K; for K ≤ bK0I , EcWI(.) is linear in
K and µ(K) = 0. (ii)To see that µ ≤ λ, consider an increase dK in K; a (suboptimal) feasible
response by the regulator that would maintain all the constraints satisfied would be to increase
all the transfers by dK and to keep the same access price schedule This would decrease its
payoﬀ by (1 + λ)dK. Therefore we have EcWI(θ,K + dK, u) ≥ EcWI(θ,K, u) − (1 + λ)dK
and so ∂E
fWI(.)
∂K ≥ −(1 + λ).(iii)Since, for K ≥ bK1I ,baI(eθ, µ = λ) = a∗I(θ) we have EcWI(θ, u) =
EW ∗I (θ, u)¥
Proof of Lemma 3. In light of Lemma 2 we have
EcWI(θ,K, u) = wI(θ,baI(θ, µ(K)))− ¡λEΠMI (θ,baI(θ, µ(K)) +K¢+ u (22)
with
∂EcWI(θ,K)
∂K
= − (1 + µ(K))
Now note that b∆I(K) > 0 forK → 0, since EΠMI (θ,baI(θ, µ = 0)) > K andEWI(θ,baI(θ, µ =
0), u) < EWI(θ, a∗I(θ), u) from a∗I(θ) = argmaxEWI(θ, aI(θ), u) and a∗I(θ) 6= baI(θ, µ = 0).
From (10), (22) and Lemma 2, we then have ∂
e∆I(K)
∂K = −λ + µ(K) ≤ 0. For K ≥ bK1I ,
EWI(θ,baI(θ, µ = λ), u) = EWI(θ, a∗I(θ), u), since baI(eθ, µ = λ) = a∗I(θ).¥
Proof of Lemma 5. Constraint (IC − IA) implies that the constraint (IR − IA) is
automatically satisfied and therefore it can be neglected. Neglecting for the moment the
constraint (IC2), the Lagrangian of the maximization problem becomesZ θ
θ
(S(θ,QI(θ, aI)) + λP (θ, aI)qM(θ, aI) + λaIqR(θ, aI) + u
−λqM(θ, aI)
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
+ νqM(θ, aI)
1− F (θ)−Υθ<θ0
f(θ)
− (ν + 1)K)dF (θ)
Since the function is strictly concave and the constraint (IC − IA) is linear in aI and in
K, the problem is convex with an unique solution. Maximization w.r.t. a yields
−(1 + 10λ)eaI(.)− θ + 5λθ − 3λ1− F (θ)f(θ) + 3ν 1− F (θ)−Υθ<θ0f(θ) = 0
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where SOC and constraint (IC2) are satisfied provided that −32 + 5λ − 3λ
∂
∂θ (
1−F (θ)
f(θ) ) +
3ν ∂∂θ (
1−F (θ)−Υθ<θ0
f(θ) ) ≥ 0.
(i) Now, let us take the case where the (IC − IA) is slacking at the solution to the
maximization program, and thus ν(K) = 0. From the (IR−IA) and the (IC−IA) it follows
that (IR−IA) cannot be binding. Thus when ν(K) = 0, we have µ = 0, and we obtain that for
allK ≤ eKI , where eKI = EbΠMI (θ, µ = 0)−bΠMI (θ0, µ = 0) = ∂2ΠMI (θ,µ)∂2θ σ22 = 16(1+∂eaI (θ,µ=0)∂θ )σ2,
the optimal mechanism is the same as under observable information. Comparing eKI with bK0I
from Lemma 2, we have eKI < bK0I . Instead for K > eKI the (IC − IA) constraint is binding
and the (IR− IA) can be neglected.
(ii) Following the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 2, we have ν(K) ≤ λ.We
now show that µ(K) ≤ ν(K).for all K > eKI Suppose by contradiction that there exists
a K > eKI , denoted by K0, such that µ(K0) > ν(K0). Then since ν(K) > µ(K) = 0 for
K ≤ bK0I , µ0(K), ν 0(K) ≥ 0 and µ00(K), ν 00(K) = 0 for all K, it follows that µ(K) ≥ ν(K)
for all K ≥ K0 , and that the level of K such that µ(K) = λ, is smaller than the level of K
such that ν(K) = λ. Take therefore a K where ν(K) < λ and µ(K) = λ. From (IR − IA),
substituting for baI (µ = λ) we haveZ θ
θ
θ + θ(5λ−1)1+10λ
3
(1− F (θ))d(θ) = K,
whilst from (ICL− IA), substituting for eaI (ν < λ)
Z θ0
θ
−F (θ)
θ +
θ(5λ−1)−3

λ 1−F (θ)f(θ) +ν(K)
F (θ)
f(θ)

1+10λ
3
dθ+
Z θ
θ0
θ +
θ(5λ−1)−3(λ−ν(K)) 1−F (θ)f(θ)
1+10λ
3
(1−F (θ))dθ = K
and it is immediate that the LHS of the (IR − IA) is greater than the LHS of (IC − IA)
implying that it cannot be that they are both binding for that level of K ¥
Proof of Lemma 6. The maximum value function is given by
EfWI(θ,K, u) = EwI(θ,eaI(θ, ν(K))− λEΠMI (θ,eaI(θ, ν(K))−K + u
with
∂EfWI(θ,K, u)
∂K
= − (1 + ν(K))
and from Lemmas 2 and 5 we have: EcWI(.) = EfWI(.) for K ≤ eKI and eK∗I ∈ ( eKI ,K∗I ).
For K ∈ ( eKI , eK∗I ), ∂EfWI(.)∂K − ∂EiWI(.)∂K = −µ(K) + ν(K), where µ(K) = 0 for all K ≤ bK0I ,
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µ(K), ν(K) ≤ λ and µ(K) ≤ ν(K) for all K. Since µ(K) = λ for all K ≥ bK1I , then the level
of K such that ν(K) = λ is a K ∈ ( eKI , bK1I ]. From this we have
∂ e∆I
∂K
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
ν(K) > 0 for K ∈ ( eKI , bK0I ]
−µ(K) + ν(K) > 0 for K ∈ ( bK0I , bK1I )
−λ+ λ = 0 for K ∈
h bK1I , eK∗I´
−1− λ for K ∈
h eK∗I ,K∗I i
if eK∗I > bK1I . The remaining cases are qualitatively similar. From the definition of e∆I , ∂ h∆I∂u = 0
for K ∈ ( eKI , eK∗I (u)] and ∂ h∆I∂u = 1 for K ∈ ( eK∗I (u),K∗I (u)].¥
Proof of Proposition 3 (i) From Proposition 1 λ ≤ λ∗ implies K∗S(u) ≥ K∗I (u). Then
from Lemmas 6 and 8 we have: e∆I(K,u) − e∆S(K,u) = −e∆S(K,u) < 0 for all K ≤ eKI
and for K ∈ (K∗I (u),K∗S(u)), whilst e∆I(K,u) − e∆S(K,u) = 0 for K ≥ K∗S(u). Then, since
the functions e∆I(K,u) and e∆S(K,u) are continuous and ∂∂K (e∆I(K,u) − e∆S(K,u)) is non-
negative for all K ∈ ( eKI ,K∗I (u)), therefore e∆I(K(u))− e∆S(K(u)) < 0 for all K. (ii) Similar
reasoning proves the result when K∗S(u) < K∗I (u). ¥
Proof of Proposition 4. It follows from (19).
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